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Abstract
We analyze the licensing of a drastic innovation when products are differentiated
due to consumer and/or product heterogeneity. We show that an industry insider
prefers to divest its production arm and license the new technology as an industry
outsider, in which case it can replicate multiproduct monopoly profit. We derive the
optimal contracts and the optimal number of licenses by assuming a logit demand
system. Optimal number of licenses, quite strikingly, increases when the technology
has a higher relative value than a commercialized alternative. This result stands in
sharp contrast with the literature on the licensing of a homogenous good.
Keywords: Patent licensing, price competition, product differentiation.
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Introduction
Technological innovation is probably the most important way we generate value. Innova-
tors, naturally, need to see a profit opportunity, a way to extract some of this value, in
order to innovate in the first place. As a result, a number of mechanisms, such as patents,
copyrights or trade secrets, have evolved to give the right incentives to the innovators.
Quite often, innovation takes place outside the industry, for example in universities.
Given that they lack their own production possibilities, technology transfer from univer-
sities has recently become a hot topic of debate.1 Moreover, the transfer of technology
has emerged as an important issue in the business realm. Wesley, Cohen and Walsh
(2000) report that between 1983-1995 patent awards grew by 78% in the U.S. based on
the Carnegie Mellon Survey on Industrial R & D. There are ten industries in which 40%
or more of the respondents report licensing revenue as a motive for patenting. Evidently,
technology transfer is seen as a source of revenue in some industries.
The bilateral relationship between the owner of a right and another agent, who is
willing to use this right, is an important kind of economic activity. This paper presents
a framework that highlights technology licensing as a paradigm to address several im-
portant questions related to how and to whom to license. We consider a scenario where
an upstream developer of an innovation has to decide on whether or not to enter the
downstream segment of the market where, using this innovation as input, the production
of a final good takes place. Additionally, the upstream firm has to choose the number of
competing downstream firms to whom it will sell its license, and the terms at which the
sales will take place.
We frame these issues using the following set-up: First, we introduce a model of
1Jensen and Thursby (2001), based on “The 1996 Survey of the Association of University Technology
Managers”, report that the number of licenses that have been executed increased 75% between 1991 and
1996, with a total of 13,087 licenses being executed over the entire period. Moreover, the respondents of
the survey have stated licensing revenues as a major objective.
3
product differentiation where we consider licensing by an industry insider. The upstream
firm will choose optimal two-part licensing contracts which involve a down payment and
running royalties. We assume that a single firm owns the rights to a drastic innovation.2
There is a large number of potential licensees whose outside option is to stay out or to
take part in the competitive production of a commercialized alternative. This implies
that the value of not being a licensee is zero.3
A first and quite general result we derive is that the owner of a license can implement
the multiproduct monopoly outcome, which delivers the highest possible level of profits, by
means of a two-part licensing contract. More interestingly, we also show that an industry
insider prefers to divest its production arm and become an industry outsider. This result
generalizes that of Sandonis and Fauli-Oller (2006) for drastic innovations. This is due to
the commitment problem the innovating firm faces: An industry insider cannot commit
to charge itself a royalty that is higher than her marginal cost plus the opportunity cost
of not selling through a licensee. As a result, implementing the multiproduct monopoly
outcome is not possible. This result holds for some quite general specifications of demand,
and product differentiation can be due to consumer and product heterogeneity.
Next, we introduce a flexible demand model—logit. By means of an outside option,
we allow for commercialized alternatives which may account for the already existing tech-
nology. Assuming a particular demand system makes it possible to derive the optimal
number of licenses as a function of market size, relative attractiveness of the new tech-
nology compared to the commercialized alternatives, fixed costs of production, marginal
costs, and the degree of product differentiation or heterogeneity of consumer tastes. We
also derive the optimal licensing contracts as a by product. The optimal number of licenses
decreases in fixed costs of production, marginal costs, and the level of substitutability,
while it increases in the market size and the relative attractiveness of the new technology.
2We have in mind the same type of innovation which Rey and Salant (2009) call an essential intellectual
property.
3The framework actually allows for any fixed level of outside option.
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Licensing is an integral part of technological innovation. Here, licensing means the
transfer of the rights to a technology in exchange for monetary compensation. Many
other kinds of economic activity are terribly similar in nature. Often governments limit
access to a market by giving operation licenses, such as for airlines, buses, and taxi-
cabs. In telecommunications, operators compensate each other for calls terminated on
each others’ networks. One could even view wholesale-retailer relationships as a kind of
licensing, where the manufacturer sells the retailer the right to further market a product.
There is a vast literature on the licensing of a new technology. Katz and Shapiro
(1985) show in a Cournot-duopoly model that it may be profitable for minor innovations
to be licensed with a fixed fee. They also show that with two-part contracts the monopoly
outcome can be replicated. Any innovation that increases industry profits when licensed
will be licensed. There is a series of papers—Kamien and Tauman (1986), Kamien, Oren
and Tauman (1992), Katz and Shapiro (1986), Erutku and Richelle (2007) — that aim
to pinpoint optimal licensing contracts. These papers study the licensing strategies of an
exclusive holder of a cost reducing technology in a Cournot oligopoly model. The licensor
is an industry outsider, e.g. a research lab. A common result is that the market structure
critically depends on the nature of the innovation. They also find that the number of
firms in the industry decreases as the innovation becomes more significant. Moreover,
drastic innovations are licensed to only a single firm.4
The main point of departure of this paper from the above mentioned ones is its anal-
ysis of licensing in a differentiated products industry. There are three papers which are
closely related to ours. Herna`ndez-Murillo and Llobet (2006) study licensing of a cost re-
ducing technology when there is product differentiation and when firms are heterogenous
with respect to their production technologies. For the downstream market, they adopt a
monopolistic competition framework, where a representative agent consumes all from a
4Erutku and Richelle (2007) obtain a contrasting result where even for drastic innovations the inno-
vation is always licensed to more than a single firm.
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continuum of products. They show that a patent holder will always employ a royalty in
addition to a fixed fee. Not surprisingly, a similar result is also obtained in this paper. A
royalty can be used as an instrument to control the marginal costs of the final products
and thus to control the final price levels. They find that the optimal number of licenses
will increase as the level of product differentiation decreases. This result is the complete
opposite of one of our findings. Their model differs from ours in two important ways:
In their model, the downstream firms have heterogenous and privately observed uses for
the innovation, and they incur no fixed costs of production. One can easily show that if
the downstream firms did not have heterogenous uses for the innovation and incurred no
fixed costs, the innovator would actually choose to sell infinitely many licenses. In some
sense, this is the common ground between our paper and theirs.
Sandonis and Fauli-Oller (2006) study a differentiated products duopoly and inves-
tigate the incentives of an external innovator to merge with an insider firm. When the
patentee is an industry outsider, a potential licensee’s outside option depends on the of-
fered licensing contracts and therefore inducing this licensee to accept a licensing contract
may become costly. In the case of large innovations, any gain from taking the outside
option for a potential licensee is low, thus it becomes optimal for the patentee to remain
an industry outsider. On the other hand, for small innovations they show that the out-
side option of a potential licensee is high, and therefore being an industry insider becomes
a more favorable option for the innovator. We depart from their model by making the
number of licenses an endogenous decision variable.
Rey and Salant (2009) set up a model of licensing an innovation where the licensees
offer differentiated products. They look at the impacts of different licensing policies, such
as fixed fee licensing and royalties, of one or more innovators. They find that with a single
owner of a drastic innovation, the innovator is indifferent between becoming an insider
or an outsider. This result is in contrast with our finding that an outsider innovator can
implement the monopoly outcome and that the innovator would always prefer to be an
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outsider. This contrast can be explained by two factors: First, in their model, they do not
allow for two-part tariffs as a licensing policy. Second, the demand model they use (Salop
circle) is restrictive in its nature, since at equilibrium the entire market is always covered
by the set of licensees. An additional byproduct is that as the value of the innovation
increases, the optimal number of licenses weakly (non-monotonically) decreases. In our
logit model there are always some consumers who do not opt for one of the new technology
products, and as a result we find that the number of licenses increases in the value of the
innovation.
In section 1, we introduce the model and compare licensing by an industry insider
with that by an outsider. The logit demand is introduced in section 2. We derive the
optimal licensing contracts for a given number of licences, the optimal number of licenses,
and the socially optimal number of licenses in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
1 The Model
Consider a monopolist, M , who is the sole owner of a production technology, and has
sunk the costs of development. M has also obtained a patent, and therefore replicating
the technology is not legally possible. This technology can be used as an input to produce
differentiated goods, and there are many firms who are ready to produce given access to
the technology. Let us denote M as firm 1 and the other firms as {2, . . . , Nmax}, with
Nmax À 2. The demand for each firm’s product is denoted by mk(p1, . . . , pNmax). When
only N firms are active, the demand is given by
mk(p1, . . . , pN) = lim
pN+1,...,pNmax→∞
mk(p1, . . . , pNmax) (1)
with N ≤ Nmax.
M has a marginal cost cIj of transferring the input technology to firm j. Each firm
incurs a marginal cost cFj to produce the final good, for j = 1, . . . , N
max. Moreover, each
firm has a fixed operating cost of Cj, j = 1, . . . , N
max.
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In the case when M licenses its technology to firm j, it uses a contract which is
formed by a fixed fee, fj and a per unit royalty rj. Price competition takes place given
the licensing contracts.
M can decide to be an active producer, in which case it is referred to as an insider. If
it chooses not to produce, then it remains an industry outsider. Let xN = (x1, . . . , xN).
Then, the profit of firm 1, M , when it produces is given by
ΠInsider1 (p
N , rN , fN) = (p1 − cI1 − cF1 )m1(pN)− C1
+
N∑
j=2
[
(rj − cIj )mj(pN) + fj
]
,
and when M only licenses, by
ΠOutsider1 (p
N , rN , fN) =
N∑
j=1
[
(rj − cIj )mj(pN) + fj
]
.
Furthermore, the profit of firm j when it produces is given by
Πj(p
N , rj, fj) = (pj − rj − cFj )mj(pN)− fj − Cj, j = 2..N,
otherwise it is fixed and normalized to zero. This normalization is not an innocent one. It
inherently assumes that the new technology is replacing an old one which is competitively
supplied. Thus the innovation in this context is assumed to be drastic.5
Given the sequence of events, it is straightforward to formalize the decision problem
faced by the owner of the technology, both when it is an insider and when it is an outsider,
assuming that the downstream firms compete in prices. Existence of a pricing equilibrium
requires that certain conditions on the demand function hold. In the remainder of the text,
we assume that the demand functions are such that Πk(p
N , rk, fk), Π
Outsider
1 (p
N , rN , fN),
and ΠInsider1 (p
N , rN , fN) are quasi-concave in the relevant variables. Therefore, first order
conditions are sufficient to characterize best responses, and hence, the equilibrium.
5If the innovation is thought to reduce marginal costs, this assumption becomes even stronger. It
requires that even the monopoly price of the new technology is sufficient to drive the rest of the firms
out of business.
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Below, we show that an industry outsider would prefer to divest its production arm
and license the technology as an industry outsider. This result is due to the commitment
problem faced by the owner of the technology when it is an industry insider. If the outside
option of a potential licensee depends on the licensing contracts this result may not hold.
Sandonis and Fauli-Oller (2003) shows that for minor innovations it may be better to be
an industry insider. However, also in their linear demand differentiated products duopoly
model, a drastic innovation is licensed by an industry outsider.
Proposition 1. When M licenses at all, it prefers only to license and not to produce an
output good.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 1 relies on an argument where the problems faced by an
outsider and an insider are similar constrained optimization problems where the insider
licensor faces one additional constraint. It follows that the profit of the outsider is always
as large as that of the insider. Notice that, this result is general and applies to any kind
of differentiated demand system which satisfies (1). The reason behind this result is that
M cannot commit to a transfer price other than its cost of producing the input plus the
opportunity cost of not selling through its licensee’s when it is an industry insider. On
the other hand, whenever it is an outsider, it is free to choose this transfer price. Thus
the implication is that under two-part licensing contracts, the owner of the technology
is going to divest itself from its production arm if it ever finds licensing attractive. Rey
and Tirole (1999) report on AT&T’s spinning off its manufacturing arm, forming the
independent entity called Lucent Technologies.
The result in Proposition 1 holds for any given number of licensees, N . Consequently,
this result is independent of the optimal number of licenses. Suppose that the innovator
finds it more profitable to be an insider in addition to selling N licenses (leading to a total
of N + 1 final good producers) to being an outsider. Then, Proposition 1 implies that
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it is even more profitable to sell N + 1 licenses and being an outsider. In other words,
regardless of the number of licenses that are sold, M would prefer to be an outsider.
If the licensor was allowed to offer more sophisticated contracts, even an industry
insider could obtain the multiproduct monopoly profits. Maurer and Scotchmer (2006)
suggest that a licensing contract which involves a downpayment and a royalty which
decreases in the output of the patentee may solve this commitment problem and result in
monopoly profits. However, such contracts would probably be deemed anti-competitive
and will not be allowed by anti-trust agencies. As stated above, the equivalence of the
insider and outsider problems only holds when the innovator can ignore the effect of its own
output price on the prices of the other firms. With a licensing contract that involves only
a fixed component, the two problems would be equivalent only when the innovator incurs
no costs of transferring its technology to the licensees.6 In the case when the licensing
contracts involve only royalties, the two problems will obviously be not equivalent.
This line of reasoning leads to an implication for the incentives to innovate. If two-part
licensing contracts are allowed, then incentives are stronger for an innovator that has no
production arm. However, if licensing contracts involve fixed fees only, the licensor will
be indifferent between becoming an insider or an outsider. In this case, that decision has
no bearing on the incentives to innovate.
2 Logit Demand
In this section, we introduce a parsimonious demand system which allows us to answer a
few questions with more specificity. Assume that there is a consumer population of size
S. Each consumer demands one unit of the produced brands or an outside alternative.
6Rey and Salant (2009) show this to be the case. However, note that with fixed fees the fully-integrated
monopoly outcome still cannot be implemented.
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Brand j produced by firm j yields the net utility
U¯ij = V¯j − αpj + ²ij,
for consumer i and the outside good yields
U¯0 = V0 + ²i0.
Assume also that ²ij is independent for all i and j, and double exponential distributed with
unit variance.7 The price sensitivity is measured by α. As α→∞, product differentiation
disappears. V¯j measures the stand alone value of a product which essentially can be viewed
as the population mean of the valuation of product j, and ²ij measures the deviation of
each individual’s personal valuation from this mean.
The presence of an outside option allows us to take the existing technologies into
account. If the existing technology is mature and not protected by patents, it is natural
to expect that it is supplied competitively. Moreover, it is possible to characterize the
level of the innovation relative to this existing outside option. 8
The expected market share of product i when there are N + 1 alternatives in total is
given by
mi(p
N) =
exp(V¯i − αpi)
exp(V0) +
∑N
j=1 exp(V¯j − αpj)
(2)
=
exp(Vi − αpi)
1 +
∑N
j=1 exp(Vj − αpj)
(3)
with Vj = V¯j − V0 for j = 1, . . . , N . The demand for each good is then given by the
product of the market share with the market size S. Namely, di(p
N) = Smi(p
N) where
di(·) represents the total demand for product i. Observe that this demand system satisfies
7This is an innocent normalization since the underlying preferences are the same when Vj and α are
measured in units of this variance.
8Given the linear form of consumer utilities, a process innovation that reduces production costs is
isomorphic to a product innovation that increases the stand alone value. This isomorphism is immediately
apparent if one redefines the price of each firm as a mark-up over marginal cost.
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property (1). For a detailed derivation of the expected market shares see Anderson, de
Palma and Thisse (1992). Using this demand system, it is possible to solve the licensing
problem in a closed form which is presented in the next section.
3 Optimal Number of Licenses and Contracts
We assume that there is complete information about the potential licensee’s costs as well
as the mean product valuations. By proposition 1 we know that ifM is going to license, it
will not produce. Therefore, it is sufficient to solve the problem for an industry outsider.
Optimal licensing in this framework involves choosing the optimal number of licensees,
N , as well as the optimal contracts (fj, rj) for j = 1, . . . , N . To achieve this,M can figure
out the optimal licensing policies given N , and then compare profits for each N in order
to choose the optimal number of licensees. In the next subsection, we provide the optimal
licensing contracts for a given N , and then derive the optimal number of contracts.
3.1 Optimal Licensing Contracts to N Firms
First, consider the problem of the monopolist producing all N brands by itself. The
optimal prices are found by solving
max
p1,...,pN
N∑
j=1
[
(pj − cIj − cFj )mj(pN)S − C
]
and they satisfy
pj = c
I
j + c
F
j +
1
α(1−∑Ni=1mi(pN)) (4)
Note that all products are sold at the same mark-up over cost. A detailed derivation
of this result can be found in Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992).9 Thus, the only
reason for a multiproduct monopolist to charge different prices would be differences in the
9They derive this result for the nested-logit model which is a generalization of the approach adopted
here.
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costs of production. However, even when the costs, and hence the prices, are the same,
the sales of each product may differ due to differences in the stand alone values, Vj.
The highest possible profit in the industry is attained by prices given by (4), as these
internalize all the cross product effects. The immediate question then is why one should
license at all. It could be that the monopolist cannot credibly sell differentiated goods,
or the monopolist might be financially constrained and does not have the funds to cover
the necessary fixed costs. Alternatively, the monopolist might be forced to license by
regulation.
Given N , M has to solve Program 1′ which reduces to
max(rj),j=1..N
N∑
j=1
[
(pj − cIj − cFj )mj(pN)S − Cj
]
(5)
such that
pj = rj + c
F
j +
1
α(1−mj(pN)) , j = 1, .., N. (6)
It is apparent that an industry outsider can attain the profits of a multiproduct monopolist
by an appropriate choice of the royalty rate. This result is summarized in the next
proposition.
Proposition 2. An industry outsider can obtain the multiproduct monopoly profits by
choosing the royalty rate to be
rj = c
I
j +
∑
i 6=j mi(p
N)
α(1−mj(pN))(1−
∑N
i=1mi(p
N))
, j = 1, . . . , N, (7)
which leads to equilibrium prices as given in (4). The fixed fee charged to each firm, fj,
is then given by
fj = (pj − rj − cFj )mj(pN)S − Cj. (8)
Proof. Observe that the highest possible level of profits are obtained by the multiproduct
monopolist with the prices given by (4). Substituting these prices in (6) yields
cIj + c
F
j +
1
α(1−∑Ni=1mi(pN)) = rj + cFj + 1α(1−mj(pN)) .
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Solving for rj produces the necessary royalty rates. ¥
Observe that the royalty rates in (7), are firm specific; they depend on any marginal
costs that might be incurred in the process of transferring the technology, as well as the
stand alone value of a particular product through the market shares that will be realized
in equilibrium.
One advantage of adopting the logit approach is that it allows us to characterize the
market shares in terms of the model primitives in closed form. However, in order to achieve
this goal, it will necessary to introduce an auxiliary concept. Lambert’s W function is
defined as
W (x) = {z|z exp(z) = x} (9)
For x real and positive, W (x) is a positive valued, increasing, and concave function of x.
We refer the interested reader to Corless et. al. (1996) for a more detailed information on
the Lambert W function. Given this definition, we characterize the equilibrium market
shares in terms of the model parameters in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium market shares are given by
m∗j =
Kj
K
W (Ke−1)
1 +W (Ke−1)
, j = 1, . . . , N, (10)
where W (·) is the Lambert W function, Kj = exp(Vj − α(cIj + cFj )), and K =
∑N
i=1Ki.
Moreover, the market share of firm j increases in Vj, and decreases in α, c
I
j and c
F
j .
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium market shares have the expected properties. Products which provide
higher surplus are the ones with higher market shares. Characterization of the market
shares in Proposition 3, allows us to compute royalty rates, fixed fees and retail prices
using (7), (8), and (4). However, when the costs and stand alone values are arbitrary,
it is not possible to make statements on how these quantities will change as one of the
model primitives changes because of the dependence of each on all of the market shares.
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Naturally, when the marginal cost and the stand alone value of each potential licensee
is different, the question of to whom to license becomes more involved. The number of
optimal licenses will depend on the distribution of these values across potential licensees.
Moreover, it is likely that in a more realistic situation the patent owner will have incom-
plete information at best, thus the implementation of a licensing mechanism will require
more complicated arguments than those offered so far. We leave this topic for future
research and continue with placing a few restrictions on the model.
One special case arises when firms are symmetric. This implies a symmetric equilib-
rium outcome. For this purpose, we assume that Vj = V , c
I
j = c
I , cFj = c
F and Cj = C
for all j in the remainder of the paper. The assumption of symmetry is commonly used
in the literature, and is also reasonable from an ex-ante perspective. The product differ-
entiation in this case is only due to consumer heterogeneity as product heterogeneity is
ruled out. In this case, Kj = k = exp(V − α(cI + cF )) for all j, and K = Nk, and thus
the equilibrium market share in (10) reduces to
m∗ =
1
N
W (Nke−1)
1 +W (Nke−1)
. (11)
The comparative statics on m∗ are the same as in Proposition (10), meaning that in
equilibrium, a new technology which is more valuable relative to the existing one will be
diffused more.
Proposition 4. If all the licensees are symmetric, the equilibrium retail price of each
product is given by
p∗ = cI + cF +
1
α(1−Nm∗) . (12)
which increases in V , cI , cF and decreases in α.
Proof. See Appendix.
Equilibrium retail prices have intuitive properties. Symmetry also implies that all the
licensees receive the same licensing contract, that is rj = r and fj = f for all j. The
symmetric licensing contract is characterized in the next proposition.
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Proposition 5. When all licensees are symmetric, the equilibrium royalty rate for each
licensee is given by
r∗ = cI +
(N − 1)m∗
α(1−m∗)(1−Nm∗) , (13)
which increases in V , cI and decreases in α, cF . The equilibrium fixed fee is given by
f ∗ =
m∗
α(1−m∗)S − C. (14)
Furthermore, f ∗ increases with V , S and decreases with α, cI , cF and C.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is interesting to note that when licensees are incurring higher marginal costs to
transform the licensed technology to the final product, royalty rates tend to be lower.
They are also lower in those industries where consumers are less heterogeneous in their
tastes for products. A new technology, which allows firms to produce products that are
more valuable relative to the commercialized alternatives (outside option), is licensed with
a higher royalty rate and a fixed fee.
3.2 Optimal Number of Licenses
The equilibrium profit of M when it licenses to N firms is given by
Π(N) =
m∗
α(1−Nm∗)NS −NC
If we were to treat N as a continuous variable temporarily, it is easy to verify that
∂Π(N)
∂N
=
m∗
α
S − C, (15)
since
∂m∗
∂N
= −m∗2(2−Nm∗). (16)
Whenever (15) is positive at N = 1, the owner of the patent will prefer licensing or
producing more than one product which is assumed in the following.
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Furthermore, (16) implies concavity of the profits in N , thus, solving (15) is sufficient
for a maximum. Observe that N can take integer values only, and therefore the optimal
number of licenses must be one of the two closest integers to the value of N which satisfy
1
N
W (Nke−1)
1 +W (Nke−1)
=
αC
S
.
The solution is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. The optimal number of licenses is given by one of the integers closest to
N∗ =
S
αC
(
1− 1
W ( kS
αC
)
)
. (17)
Moreover, N∗ increases with V and S, while it decreases with α, cI , cF and C.
Proof. See Appendix.
The fact that the optimal number of licenses increases with V , or similarly decreases
with cF , implies that a new technology which is drastically better than the alternatives
will be licensed to a greater number of firms. This result stands in sharp contrast with
the homogenous goods Cournot-oligopoly licensing literature. The underlying factor is
the value of variety in the present model, such that when there are more brands, more
consumers opt for one of the products rather buying the commercialized alternative—a
typical feature for differentiated products.
Empirical evidence for such practices is vast and often referred to as puzzling. A good
example is the liberal licensing policies adopted by Phillips and Sony in the case of Audio
CD technology. Even though there may have been additional reasons, such as network
effects, for increasing CD sales10, there is no question that CD technology is a large
leap from the vinyl-records or audio cassettes for delivering printed music. Moreover,
either of these technologies were widely available and produced by many firms at the
time of the introduction of the CD technology in the early eighties. According Grindley
and Mc Bride(1992), there were more than 30 licensees of the CD technology by 1981.
10Both Phillips and Sony owned two of the largest record companies at the time.
17
Both Phillips and Sony produce CD-players as well, however, considering the size of each
company, it might be that the commitment problem they faced was not much of an issue,
and therefore they did not divest their production arms.
On the other hand, as α increases the effect of consumer heterogeneity vanishes and
products are perceived to be closer substitutes. The optimal number of licenses tends to
decrease in this case. It is apparent from the (15) that, for sufficiently large α, it may
be that only a single firm gets a license. In some sense, this result implies the continuity
of the outcomes in the degree of heterogeneity of consumer tastes. When consumers are
homogenous, that is when α → ∞, the optimal number of licenses is one, which would
be the case under price competition in a homogenous products market.
3.3 Social Planner’s Problem
In this section, we are going to set up the social planner’s problem while ignoring the
impact of the outcome on the incentives to innovate. A social planner chooses the number
of licenses and the final sales price of the products given a drastic innovation. Even
though abstracting from the effects of the said policy choices on the incentives to innovate
might seem unrealistic, one can think of a situation where the planner commissions the
technological innovation, pays an upfront fee to obtain the rights and then chooses the
number of licenses and the terms in which the products will be sold.11 We restrict our
attention to the case where all firms are symmetric. It is relatively straightforward to
show that our results carry over to the more general case.
Note that at the optimal policy the social planner will always distribute the licenses
for free. We will first start by showing that the optimal final product sales policy involves
marginal cost pricing. Next, we are going to solve for the socially optimal number of
licenses. The number of licences that maximizes the social welfare function turns out to
be always greater than the number that maximizes the monopolist’s profit.
11It could also be that the social planner itself comes up with the innovation.
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Proposition 7. The socially optimal sales price of each final product equals the combined
marginal costs of transfer and production, cI + cF .
Proof. See Appendix.
The result is quite intuitive. For a given number of licenses, an increase in the final
sales price leads to a loss in consumer surplus some of which is captured by the firms as
profits. The rest, however, is dead-weight-loss—the loss in surplus due to the reduction
in consumption. By a similar argument a sales price below the combined marginal costs
is never optimal.
Proposition 8. The socially optimal number of licenses must be one of the two integers
closest to the value of N which satisfy
N¯ =
S
αC
− exp(−V + α(cI + cF )). (18)
Furthermore, the socially optimal number of licenses is always greater than privately op-
timal number of licenses.
Proof. See Appendix.
While determining the optimal number of licenses to sell, the monopolist faces a
tradeoff. As the number of firms increases, consumer valuations for the final products
and hence the amount that can be extracted from each firm increase. On the other hand,
competition between firms becomes more intense as their number grows. According to
Proposition 8, it is the second effect that is more dominant for the monopolist.
It is also worth pointing out that at the optimal policy formulated above, each firm
needs to be subsidized for an amount equal to its fixed costs of production. This is what
we call the ‘first-best’ solution, where the social planner is not concerned with balancing
its budget.
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4 Conclusion
We analyze patent licensing when products are differentiated due to consumer and/or
product heterogeneity. We consider two part licensing contracts, which involve a fixed
downpayment and running royalties that are quite common in practice. The first result,
which holds quite generally, is that an industry insider prefers to divest its production
arm and license the new technology as an industry outsider. This is due to a commitment
problem faced by the industry insider, which can only credibly commit to a transfer
price(self-royalty) of marginal cost plus the opportunity cost of not licensing. When the
patent owner remains outside the industry, it is free to choose this royalty, and in fact, is
able to replicate multiproduct monopoly profits by using two part licensing contracts.
Given that a patent owner is better off as an industry outsider, the licensing problem
involves choosing a fixed fee, a royalty rate and the optimal number of licenses. We derive
optimal contracts given a certain number of licenses, and then obtain the optimal number
of licenses by assuming a logit demand system. We characterize equilibrium market shares
in terms of the model primitives, which in turn allow us to further characterize equilibrium
prices and licensing contracts under the assumption of symmetric firms.
The optimal contracts have intuitive properties: Both the royalty rate and the fixed
fee increase in the relative value of the new technology. Both decrease in the marginal
cost of transforming the input technology to a final good. Interestingly, any costs that
the patent owner might incur due to the transfer of the technology increase the royalty
rate while they decrease the fixed fee. The fixed fee is larger for a larger market. The
retail prices increase in the relative value of the technology, while they decrease in the
substitutability of the products and the marginal costs of production.
Finally, we derive the optimal number of licenses, which quite strikingly increase when
the technology has a higher relative value than a commercialized alternative. This result
stands in sharp contrast with the literature on the licensing of a homogenous good. The
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main force behind this result is the fact that variety has value, that is, more consumers
purchase the new technology when there are more products employing it. Furthermore,
the number of licences that maximizes social welfare is always greater than the number
that maximizes the monopolist’s profit. In our logit model, the value of increased variety
to the monopolist is diminished by the loss in revenues due to the increased competition
between the licensees.
This paper contributes to the licensing literature by adding to the relatively scarce
research on licensing with product differentiation. We also believe that it serves as a solid
benchmark for a more general case with multiple competing innovations. One valuable
extension to the current model would be to add a first stage innovation game where
the competition between potential innovators and their incentives to innovate would be
dependent on the nature of second stage licensing contracts and the number of licenses
they sell. This is left as future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that M licenses to N firms. The pricing game takes place given (fj, rj), for
j = 2, . . . , N . When M is an outsider, the equilibrium is determined by the simultaneous
solution of
pj = rj + c
F
j −
mj(p
N)
∂
∂pj
mj(pN)
, j = 1, .., N.
On the other hand, when M is an insider the equilibrium is determined by the solution
of
pj = rj + c
F
j −
mj(p
N)
∂
∂pj
mj(pN)
, j = 2..N,
p1 = c
I
1 + c
F
1 −
m1(p
N)
∂
∂p1
m1(pN)
− 1
∂
∂p1
m1(pN)
N∑
j=2
(rj − cIj )
∂
∂p1
mj(p
N)
Given these relationships, M selects optimal contracts (fj, rj). When it is an outsider
the optimal contracts are selected as a solution to
Program 1
max
(fj ,rj),j=1..N
N∑
j=1
[
(rj − cIj )mj(pN) + fj
]
such that
pj = rj + c
F
j −
mj(p
N)
∂
∂pj
mj(pN)
, j = 1, .., N
fj ≤ Πj(pN , rj, fj)− Cj, j = 1, .., N
Substituting the second set of constraints yields
Program 1′ :
A = max
(rj),j=1..N
N∑
j=1
[
(pj − cIj − cFj )mj(pN)− Cj
]
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such that
pj = rj + c
F
j −
mj(p
N)
∂
∂pj
mj(pN)
, j = 1, .., N
When M is an insider on the other hand, the optimal contracts are determined by
Program 2
max
(fj ,rj),j=2,...,N
(p1 − cI1 − cF1 )m1(pN)− C1
+
N∑
j=2
[
(rj − cIj )mj(pN) + fj
]
,
such that
p1 = c
I
1 + c
F
1 −
m1(p
N)
∂
∂p1
m1(pN)
− 1
∂
∂p1
m1(pN)
N∑
j=2
(rj − cIj )
∂
∂p1
mj(p
N)
pj = rj + c
F
j −
mj(p
N)
∂
∂pj
mk(pN)
, j = 2, .., N
fj ≤ Πj(pN , rj, fj)− Cj, j = 2, .., N
Let
r1 = c
I
1 −
1
∂
∂p1
m1(pN)
N∑
j=2
(rj − cIj )
∂
∂p1
mj(p
N)
and substitute the last set of constraints in Program 2 to yield
Program 2′
B = max
(rj),j=1,...,N
N∑
j=1
[
(pj − cIj − cFj )mj(pN)− Cj
]
,
such that
pj = rj + c
F
j −
mj(p
N)
∂
∂pj
mj(pN)
, j = 1, .., N
r1 = c
I
1 −
1
∂
∂p1
m1(pN)
N∑
j=2
(rj − cIj )
∂
∂p1
mj(p
N)
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Comparing Program 1′ and Program 2′, it is apparent that we have the same opti-
mization problem with one more constraint in the second one. Thus, the maximum of the
second program must be less than or equal to the first one. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
The equilibrium market shares satisfy
mj(p
N)
1−∑Ni=1mi(pN) = exp(Vj − αcj − 11−∑Ni=1mi(pN)), (19)
where cj = c
I
j + c
F
j . Rearranging (19) yields
mj(p
N)
1−∑Ni=1mi(pN) exp( 11−∑Ni=1mi(pN)) = Kj. (20)
Summing (20) over j results∑N
i=1mi(p
N)
1−∑Ni=1mi(pN) exp( 11−∑Ni=1mi(pN)) = K. (21)
Let
y =
∑N
i=1mi(p
N)
1−∑Ni=1mi(pN) ,
then it is easy to verify that
1
1−∑Ni=1mi(pN) = 1 + y.
Therefore, (21) can be re-written as
y ey =
K
e
. (22)
Thus, y = W (Ke−1), and also observe that
mj(p
N)(1 + y)exp(1 + y) = Kj.
The equilibrium market share of firm j is then given by (10).
For proving the second part of the proposition, it is useful to first note that
∂
∂Kj
m∗j =
[
W (Ke−1)
(1 +W (Ke−1))3
Kj
K2
+
W (Ke−1)
(1 +W (Ke−1))
∑
i6=j Ki
K2
]
=
1
K
[
(1−
N∑
i=1
m∗i )
2m∗j +
N∑
i6=j
m∗i
]
> 0, (23)
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that is, the market share of firm j is increasing in Kj. The rest of the comparative statics
directly follows.¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Imposing symmetry implies that the equilibrium outcome is also symmetric. Then,
the equilibrium market share of each firm is given by
m∗ =
1
N
W (Nke−1)
1 +W (Nke−1)
.
Now a change in one of the model primitives leads to a change in the surplus of all the
firms, log(k). Consequently, it is easy to verify that
∂
∂k
m∗ =
1
k
m∗(1−Nm∗)2 > 0.
Also note that ∂k/∂V = k > 0, ∂k/∂cH = −αk > 0, for H ∈ {I, F} and ∂k/∂α =
−(cI + cF )k > 0. Therefore,
∂
∂V
p∗ =
N
α(1−Nm∗)2
(1
k
m∗(1−Nm∗)2)k = Nm∗
α
> 0,
∂
∂α
p∗ = − 1
α2(1−Nm∗) +
N
α(1−Nm∗)2
(1
k
m∗(1−Nm∗)2)(−(cI + cF )k)
= − 1
α2(1−Nm∗) −
Nm∗(cI + cF )
α
< 0,
and
∂
∂cH
p∗ = 1 +
N
α(1−Nm∗)2
(1
k
m∗(1−Nm∗)2)(−αk)
= 1−Nm∗ > 0,
for H ∈ {I, F}.¥
Proof of Proposition 5 It is easy to verify that (7) and (8) reduce to (13) and (14)
when symmetry is imposed. To derive the comparative statics, first note that
∂
∂m∗
r∗ =
(N − 1)(1−Nm∗2)
α(1−m∗)2(1−Nm∗)2 > 0,
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and
∂
∂m∗
f ∗ =
S
α(1−m∗)2 > 0.
Then
∂
∂V
r∗ =
∂r∗
∂m∗
∂m∗
∂k
(k) > 0,
∂
∂cF
r∗ =
∂r∗
∂m∗
∂m∗
∂k
(−αk) < 0
∂
∂cI
r∗ = 1 +
∂r∗
∂m∗
∂m∗
∂k
(−αk)
=
(N − 1)(1−m∗ − (N − 1)m∗2)
(1−m∗)2 > 0,
since 1−m∗ − (N − 1)m∗2 > 1−m∗ − (N − 1)m∗ > 0, and
∂
∂α
r∗ = − (N − 1)m
∗
α2(1−m∗)(1−Nm∗) +
∂r∗
∂m∗
∂m∗
∂k
(−(cI + cF )k) < 0.
Similarly, the comparative statics can be found found for f ∗ as
∂
∂V
f ∗ =
∂f ∗
∂m∗
∂m∗
∂k
(k) > 0,
∂
∂S
f ∗ =
m∗
α(1−m∗) > 0,
∂
∂C
f ∗ = −1 < 0,
∂
∂cH
f ∗ =
∂f ∗
∂m∗
∂m∗
∂k
(−αk) < 0
for H ∈ {I, F}, and
∂
∂α
f ∗ = − m
∗S
α2(1−m∗) +
∂f ∗
∂m∗
∂m∗
∂k
(−(cI + cF )k) < 0.
¥
Proof of Proposition 6 Let L = αC/S, then it is easy to verify that
W (Nke−1) =
NL
1−NL.
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By the definition of the Lambert’s W function we have
NL
1−NL exp(
NL
1−NL) = Nke
−1,
1
1−NL exp(
1
1−NL) =
k
L
.
Therefore,
W (
k
L
) =
1
1−NL, (24)
and solving (24) for N yields the expression for N∗. In order to perform the comparative
statics, first note that,
∂
∂k
N∗ =
1
W (k/L)(1 +W (k/L))Lk
> 0,
and
∂
∂L
N∗ = − W (k/L)
(1 +W (k/L))L2
< 0.
Furthermore, ∂L/∂S = −αC/S2,∂L/∂α = C/S , and ∂L/∂C = α/S. Therefore,
∂
∂V
N∗ =
∂
∂k
N∗k > 0,
∂
∂S
N∗ =
∂
∂L
N∗(−αC
S2
) > 0,
∂
∂C
N∗ =
∂
∂L
N∗(
α
S
) < 0,
∂
∂cH
N∗ =
∂
∂k
N∗(−αk) < 0,
for H ∈ {I, F}, and
∂
∂α
N∗ =
∂
∂k
N∗(−(cI + cF )k) + ∂
∂L
N∗(
C
S
) < 0.
¥
Proof of Proposition 7
Consumer surplus, when there areN available brands that are sold at prices p1, . . . , pN ,
is given by
CS(pN ;N) =
1
α
log
(
1 +
N∑
i=1
eV¯i−αpi
)
S
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(see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for the derivation). The consumer surplus
function satisfies Roy’s identity, i.e. ∂
∂pj
CS(pN ;N) = −mj(pN)S. When the social
planner decides to award licenses to N firms, the aggregate welfare is given by
W (pN ;N) = CS(pN ;N) +
N∑
j=1
(pj − cI − cF )mj(pN)S −NC.
The first order condition for setting the price of variant i is given by
∂W (pN ;N)
∂pi
= −mj(pN)S+mj(pN)S+
N∑
j=1
(pj−cI−cF )S∂mj(p
N)
∂pi
= 0, i = 1, . . . , N.
Finally, p1 = p2 = . . . = pN = c
I + cF solves the system of N first order conditions
simultaneously.
¥
Proof of Proposition 8
When all available brands are sold at the same price that is equal to the marginal
cost, p¯ = p1 = p2 = . . . = pN = c
I + cF , the consumer surplus reduces to
CS(N) =
1
α
log
(
1 +Nk
)
S
where k = exp(V − α(cI + cF )). At these prices, aggregate welfare reduces to
W (N) = CS(N)−NC.
It is easy to verify that
∂W (N)
∂N
=
kS
(1 +Nk)α
− C = m¯S
α
− C
where m¯ is the market share of a variant when all firms charge a marginal cost price.
Moreover, we have that
∂2W (N)
∂N2
= − k
2S
(1 +Nk)2α
= −m¯
2S
α
< 0,
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and therefore aggregate welfare is a concave function of the number of available variants
when they are all sold at marginal cost prices. The number of licenses which maximizes
aggregate welfare solves
k
(1 +Nk)α
=
C
S
.
Next, it is straightforward to show that the socially optimal number of licenses is given
by
N¯ =
S
Cα
− 1
k
=
S
Cα
− exp(−V + α(cI + cF )).
Rewriting the socially optimal number of licenses as
N¯ =
S
Cα
(
1− Cα
kS
)
,
recall that the optimal number of licenses from the patentee’s perspective is given by
N∗ =
S
αC
(
1− 1
W ( kS
αC
)
)
.
Define η = kS
Cα
> 0. Then, it is straightforward to show that
N¯ −N∗ ∝ −1
η
+
1
W (η)
.
Therefore, N¯ −N∗ has the same sign as h(η) = eta−W (η). Note that
dh(η)
dη
= 1− W (η)
(1 +W (η))η
and
d2h(η)
dη2
=
W (η)2(2 +W (η))
(1 +W (η))3η2
> 0;
hence, h(η) convex in η. It can be verified that limη→0 h(η) = 0. Then, h(η) is an
increasing function of η for η > 0. Furthermore, h(0) = 0. Therefore, h(η) > 0 for η > 0
which in turn implies that N¯ −N∗ > 0, or equivalently N¯ > N∗. ¥
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